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EXECUTIVE ORDER

## ESTABLISHING RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Previous guidance on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and United States citizens was unclear. This order clarifies that relationship by detailing those activities which are prohibited. Without setting forth all restrictions under which foreign intelligence agencies are obliged to operate, nor derogating from any other laws, rules, regulations, or directives further restricting the activities of these agencies, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION I. Definitions. As used in this Order the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them below:

(a) "Collection" means the gathering and storage, or the gathering and forwarding, of information.

(b) "Domestic activities" means activities within the United States.

(c) "Foreign intelligence" means information, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations or their agents.

(d) "United States citizens" means United States citizens and permanent resident aliens.

(e) "Foreign counterintelligence" means activities conducted to protect the United States and United States citizens from foreign espionage, sabotage, subversion, assassination, or terrorism.

(f) "Incidental reception" means the receipt of information, collection of which by an agency is otherwise prohibited by this order and which is collected in the course of an agency's authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities.

(g) "Foreign intelligence agency" means any department or agency of the United States government, or component thereof, which is primarily engaged in foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activities.

SECTION II. The following activities shall not be conducted either by any foreign intelligence agency or by any other department or agency in pursuit of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence:

(a) Physical surveillance of United States citizens, <sup>within the United States</sup> except to the extent that such surveillance is in accordance with law and is:

(1) Upon written approval by the head of the foreign intelligence department or agency, <sup>and is surveillance</sup> of individuals currently or formerly employed by that agency, its present or former contractors, or such contractors' employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; or

(2) Of a person having contact with any persons described under subparagraph (1), or <sup>WITH</sup> foreign nationals in the United States in connection with foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations, but only to the extent necessary to identify such person.

(b) Electronic surveillance of United States citizens except in accordance with law and under procedures approved by the Attorney General, and in no instance shall the Central Intelligence Agency engage within the United States in the electronic surveillance of United States citizens.

(c) Testing of electronic surveillance equipment within the United States except in accordance with law and under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

(d) Any opening of United States mail or examination of envelopes except in accordance with the provisions of United States postal laws and regulations.

(e) Access to Federal income tax returns or tax information except in accordance with statutes and regulations.

(f) Infiltration or secret participation in any organization composed primarily of United States citizens for the purpose of reporting on its activities or membership.

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with the informed consent of each such human subject and in accordance  
with the guidelines of the National Commission for the Protection of  
Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research.

(h) Operation of a proprietary company on a commercially  
competitive basis with United States businesses except to the minimum  
extent necessary to establish commercial credibility. <sup>or to achieve clearly defined</sup> No investments <sup>foreign</sup>  
by a proprietary company shall be made on the basis of any substantive <sup>intellig</sup>  
intelligence not available to the public. <sup>Object</sup>

(i) Collection, evaluation, correlation or analysis, of infor-  
mation other than information from public sources or given voluntarily  
by its subject concerning the domestic activities of United States citizens  
except:

(1) Information about a United States citizen who in good <sup>faith</sup>  
<sup>secretly</sup> is reasonably believed to be involved in international terrorist or  
narcotics activities or working in collaboration with a foreign nation or  
organization, but only if the information is collected abroad or from  
foreign sources in the United States in the course of an authorized foreign  
intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activity.

(2) Information related to the performance of agency  
contractors, for purposes of contract administration.

(3) Information concerning criminal activities received through incidental reception, provided it is only transmitted to law enforcement agencies with appropriate jurisdiction.

SECTION III. Any federal agency seeking foreign intelligence within the United States from United States citizens shall disclose to such citizens its true identity. When collection of foreign intelligence within the United States results in the incidental reception of information from unknowing United States citizens, however, the receiving agency shall be permitted to make appropriate use of such information.

SECTION IV. No information on the domestic activities of United States citizens shall be transmitted to a foreign intelligence agency (or to any other federal agency to aid it in engaging in foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence) from any other federal agency unless:

(a) The information had been lawfully compiled by the transmitting agency in furtherance of its authorized mission;

(b) The information is of a type which the receiving agency would itself have been permitted to collect under the provisions of this order;

(c) The information is provided in furtherance of the authorized mission and responsibilities of the receiving agency;

(d) The information is provided in good faith under a reasonable belief that the information is relevant to the receiving agency; and

(e) The information is provided under guidelines and procedures issued by the Attorney General designed to ensure the protection of the constitutional and statutory rights of United States citizens.

SECTION V. Nothing in this Order prohibits an agency from retaining information when retention is required by law, such as retention required to preserve evidence or other information for possible court action.

SECTION VI. No foreign intelligence agency shall:

(a) Provide services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration or state or local police organizations of the United States except as expressly authorized by law; or

(b) Participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United States except as may be authorized by law.

Provided, that this prohibition shall not preclude:

(1) Cooperation between a foreign intelligence agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence; or

(2) Provision of specialized equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other Federal department or agency.

SECTION VII. Foreign intelligence agency personnel may not be detailed elsewhere within the Federal government except as <sup>consistent with</sup> authorized by law.

Employees so detailed shall be responsible to the host agency and shall not report to their parent agency on the affairs of the host agency except as may be directed by the host agency. The head of the host agency and any subsequent successor shall be informed of the detailee's association with the parent agency.

SECTION VIII. Nothing in this Order shall prohibit any agency having law enforcement responsibilities from discharging such responsibilities pursuant to law. Nor shall this Order apply to any activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SECTION IX. Nothing in this Order shall prohibit any agency from engaging in the collection, evaluation, correlation and analysis of information on current or former employees (including military personnel and employees of other Federal departments or agencies detailed for service with the foreign intelligence agency); applicants for employment with such agency; voluntary sources or contacts or individuals who in good faith are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts; current and former contractors and current or former employees or applicants for employment by such contractors; and all persons not included above who must be given access to classified information <sup>or information</sup> which could disclose foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence sources and methods; provided, however, that collection of such information is done only in accordance with law and by written authority from the head of such agency to determine the fitness of such persons to become or remain associated with such agency or to have such access, or in the case of a former employee to investigate matters related to his period of employment, or in the case of a voluntary source or contact, to determine suitability or credibility.



EXECUTIVE ORDER IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS  
ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Today the President issued an executive order setting forth certain restrictions on the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and other agencies which may engage in intelligence activities. <sup>prohibits or</sup> It severely restricts the following activities:

- Collection and analysis of information on the domestic activities of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens.
- Physical or electronic surveillance of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens within the United States.
- Opening of United States mail in violation of law.
- Illegally obtaining federal income tax returns or information.
- Infiltration of domestic groups for the purpose of reporting on them.
- Experimentation with drugs on humans without the subject's informed consent.
- Operation of a proprietary company which competes with United States businesses more than the minimum amount necessary to establish commercial credibility, or to attain important intelligence objectives.

- Collection of intelligence from United States citizens and permanent resident aliens within the United States without disclosing the true identity of the collecting agency.

- Sharing among agencies information on the domestic activities of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens except in compliance with stringent safeguards.

- Providing assistance to law-enforcement agencies in violation of law.

Certain limited exceptions are included to the general prohibition of collection of information on the domestic activities of United States citizens. These exceptions seek to recognize all legitimate needs of foreign intelligence agencies to collect information on the domestic activities of United States citizens.

In order to protect classified information, intelligence agencies must run security checks on applicants for employment and employees. Like any Government agency, these agencies must also check out employee backgrounds to ascertain their job suitability. Even after a person has left an intelligence agency, it has a legitimate need to maintain its records on that person should a security breach stemming from his employment occur. Similarly, each intelligence agency has an interest in

the suitability and security worthiness of persons who  
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contract with it or are employees of its contractors working on its projects and requiring access to classified information.

Each intelligence agency must also maintain records on persons who, without necessarily being employed by it, are given access to its classified information. Such persons would include employees of other Government agencies who require access to its classified information and private citizens who voluntarily agree to be cleared to receive classified information in order to aid in their voluntary reporting of foreign intelligence information to the agency.

Foreign intelligence agencies or other foreign groups spend many resources seeking to penetrate (i.e., obtain information from) United States intelligence agencies. The United States agencies need to protect themselves from such activities. Such activities may involve domestic activities of United States citizens. Because United States intelligence agencies have a need to understand the operating modes of foreign intelligence agencies, there is a legitimate need for it to collect and use such information. However, the intelligence agencies are permitted to collect this type of information only abroad or from foreign <sup>SOURCES</sup> services, since the FBI is fully capable of collecting such information from purely domestic sources. Also, because of the unique contacts of our foreign intelligence agencies with information sources abroad and

foreign sources within the United States, these agencies  
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are also permitted to collect, but only from these special  
sources, information on United States citizens reasonably  
believed to be involved in international terrorist or  
narcotics activities.

In normal day-to-day business, many Americans work with  
intelligence agencies and tell its employees about their  
domestic activities; i.e., other Government employees meet  
with intelligence agency employees; academics share informa-  
tion with them; Americans who travel talk to them. In order  
to allow these agencies to maintain records of such day-to-day  
transactions, the order makes an appropriate exception.  
Americans who enter into such contact with intelligence  
agencies, however, should not therefore be subjected to  
security investigations or other scrutiny merely because they  
came into contact with an employee of an intelligence agency.  
Therefore, this exception only allows use of that information  
voluntarily supplied by the persons themselves.

The order requires that the information collected or stored  
under these exceptions be confined to a type appropriate to the  
purpose for which the corresponding exception was created.  
For example, an agency may not collect or store information on  
the political views of a United States citizen merely because  
he is a contractor employee working on an agency project.

The order also allows intelligence agencies to transmit to

law-enforcement agencies information relating to criminal  
domestic information which it happens  
to obtain incidentally to its proper foreign intelligence  
activities. All citizens and Government agencies have an  
obligation to turn information related to criminal activity  
over to appropriate authorities.